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MACAELA DANYELE DAY,
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Appellee,

:

vs.

:
Case No. 20190277

TYLER BARNES,
Appellant.

:
:

ARGUMENT
I. MELINDA’S RULE 108 ARGUMENT WAS PRESERVED.
On page eight of his brief Michael cites to various authorities for the notion
that Melinda failed to preserve her Rule 108 objection to Michael’s exhibits used at
the evidentiary hearing. However, it is untrue that Melinda ever waived her
objection to Michael’s exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 was introduced by Michael (a text chain
between the parties which implies she was not afraid of him), and Melinda objected
to the text as irrelevant (due to it being a basis for a separate contempt action). R.
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314, 7-21. Melinda’s objection was overruled, and her objection was clearly
preserved. R. 315, 15-18; R. 391, 16-25. Also, Melinda had immediately objected
to the use of the video evidence during the hearing – having never seen it
previously, i.e., exhibits 2 and 3. In so doing, Melinda cited to the general
prohibition against presenting new evidence that had not been presented to the
Commissioner unless there had been a substantial change in circumstances
pursuant to Civil Rule 108(c). R. 322, 25; 323, 324, 10. Nevertheless, Michael
correctly cites to the fact that Melinda, upon the Court’s ruling to allow the video
evidence, and upon reviewing the videos at the evidentiary hearing, stipulated to
the court’s consideration of the video tape as evidence of Melinda’s response to his
stalking behavior – because she thought the evidence proved that Michael had
stalked her (and that her responses were simply defensive).
Nevertheless, upon being denied the opportunity to present a rebuttal email
evidence on her phone at the end of the hearing (and prior to beginning her closing
argument), Melinda renewed her Rule 108 objection about the unfairness of
allowing Michael’s exhibits without proof of a substantial change of
circumstances, but denying her the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. R.
556, 15-25; R. 557, 14-25; R. 558, 1-7. The Court denied Melinda’s renewed
objection – even though the presentation of evidence had closed moments earlier in
2

this bench trial. R. 558, 9. Therefore, the record clearly states that Melinda had
renewed her Rule 108 objection at the end of the evidentiary hearing – regardless
of what happened earlier on.
Additionally, Michael’s reference to Melinda’s stipulation to exhibits 1 and
4 – as being evidence of her consent for the District Court’s consideration of that
evidence materially – in incongruous to precedents in the American common law.
That is, it is reasonable to infer that in light of the District Court’s ruling regarding
evidence not presented to the Commissioner being allowed generally during the
beginning and throughout the evidentiary hearing, that Melinda only stipulated to
those exhibits as to their authenticity – while preserving her objection as to the
Court’s abuse of discretion under Civil Rule 108. Cf. United States v. Lynn, 592
572, 578 (4th Cir. 2010) (where the federal court abandoned a formalistic approach
to lodging a standing objection when an objection had been previously made and
the court had previously rejected the party’s arguments).
Here, Melinda went beyond the Lynn holding, and effectively made a
standing objection to Michael’s exhibits. She had advised the District Court of the
Rule 108 prohibition for allowing evidence not presented to the commissioner (R.
160-61; R. 556, l. 17-24; R. 557, 14-25; R. 558, 1-6; R. 564, 21-25). Melinda then
stated effectively that she objected to any evidence that did not comport with Rule
3

108's limitations on presenting new evidence (R. 299, 21-25; R. 300-304, 1-17).
Therefore, whether the District Court violated Civil Rule 108 in allowing
Michael’s evidence which had not been presented to the Commissioner was
effectively preserved under the authority cited in the American common law.
Secondly, on pages eight and nine of his brief, Michael alleges that because
Melinda did not provide a copy of the transcript for the commissioner hearing, her
appeal is fatally flawed. However, in Day v. Barnes, 2018 Ut 143, 427 P.3d 1272,
this Court stated that the District Court must make independent findings related to
an objection of a commissioner’s recommendation. Id. at 1276, ¶19. Therefore,
whether evidence was or wasn’t presented before the commissioner is generally
less important in the context of an objection made to the Commissioner’s
recommendation because the District Court has ultimate discretion to consider
what evidence it wants – assuming it does so fairly under Day and the principle of
due process. However, here, it is abundantly clear that Michael’s representations to
the District Court during the evidentiary hearing about having presented “a lot of
evidence” to the District Court persuaded the latter to allow presentation of the
previously undisclosed exhibits 1 and 4 due to lack of prejudice (R. 326, 9-11).
Therefore, whether Michael in fact presented his exhibits to the commissioner is
material for that reason.
4

Lastly, Michael failed to address Melinda’s fair notice argument on page 26
of her brief related to his failure to succinctly state his objection to the
Commissioner’s ruling as required by Civil Rule 108. Indeed, in his objection,
Michael failed to mention anything about the evidence he had allegedly proffered
to the commissioner as a basis for the objection. R. 99-101. Furthermore, the
commissioner’s minute entry for the hearing actually states that Michael only
offered a DCFS report. R. 85. It is black letter law that when a party fails to
respond to a party’s argument, it effectively concedes that point. Therefore, the
Court should find that Michael concedes the fact that he had not provided notice of
the exhibits in his written objection.
II. THE MARSHALING ARGUMENT FAILS.
On page 10 of his brief, Michael contends that Melinda failed to marshal the
evidence generally. However, here the important issue is whether the District
Court misapplied the law regarding stalking, and the need to consider Melinda’s
particular vulnerabilities pursuant to Baird and the stalking statute generally, i.e.,
U.C.A. § 75-5-106.5. On page 10 of his brief, Michael correctly cites to authority
for the notion that credibility determinations are generally in the province of the
District Court. However, credibility of the party witnesses was not the central issue
here. In the Court’s oral findings, it found that Michael had stalked Melinda. R.
5

581, 14-25; R. 582, 1-11.
The Court then misapplied as a matter of law the cumulative effect of
Michael’s stalking of Melinda. That is, the Court simply and inappropriately
downplayed the cumulative effect of the stalking behavior in the context of a high
conflict divorce. R. 582, 14. Indeed, the Court ruled that because the parties had
engaged in videotaping each other regularly (Michael initiating and Melinda
recording to obtain evidence of the stalking, R. 585, 1-7), that such behavior was
normal for the parties (R. 585, 1-7), that fact was crucial to the Court’s application
of the individualized objective standard (R. 580, 24, 581, 13), and that Michael
would not have known that his continual stalking behavior caused Melinda to fear
(R. 584, 25; R. 585-1-7) or to be emotionally upset – let alone Melinda being
actually fearful or upset.
However, this approach was wrong as a matter of law for three reasons.
First, the standard for a person causing fear in the stalking context is the objective,
reasonable person – not Melinda’s subjective lack of fear due to her history of high
conflict with Michael which induced tolerance. Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, 322
P.3d 728, 734-35, ¶22-25.
Second, and most importantly, continual stalking behavior equates to
continued fright rather than tolerance or indifference as a matter of the Utah
6

common law. For example, in Coombs v. Dietrich, 2011 UT App. 136, 253 P.3d
1121, 1125, ¶13, this Court held that the crime of stalking, by its very nature, when
repeated induces accumulated fear in the victim. Therefore, there are far more
reasonable inferences to draw from Melinda’s offering to sit next to Michael at the
children’s soccer match, e.g., as a means to appease her victimizer out of fright, or
to save the children from conflict and/or public embarrassment (while suppressing
her fear), or to avoid the stalking behavior by moving toward other persons in the
area. However, the District Court’s conclusion that Melinda’s decision to sit next
to Melinda at the soccer match after a history of a high conflict divorce, the
appointment of a special master, numerous requests for rulings by the special
master, and harsh sanctions imposed by the court, because she exercised her parenttime while safely at curb side at Michael’s residence with her windows rolled up
and car doors locked is simply not supported by Coombs. Consequently, the
District Court missed entirely the cumulative impact on a reasonable person of
being subjected to continuous photographing and videotaping in the stalking
context. The Court reached its conclusion despite it also finding that Melinda had
presented a great deal of evidence for a pattern of Michael’s stalking and her
subjective fear (R. 167-69). Therefore, there is no material fact to marshal in
Michael’s favor – given the Court’s finding of historic stalking behavior by
7

Michael. Thus, the marshaling requirement should not be given much weight – if
any – in this instance.
Third, the Court misapplied the individualized subjective standard test set
forth in Baird. On the one hand, the Court found that Melinda was not a vulnerable
adult (R. 385, 16), despite Melinda’s unimpeached testimony that she had suffered
a traumatic head injury that had left her unable to lift more than five pounds and the
need to wear hand braces (R. 158, 10-25; R. 184, 9-25; R. 185, 1-8). However, the
Court focused on the parties’ historic “banter,” rather than on how Melinda’s
physical limitations would have caused her subjectively and a reasonable person to
fear. Thus, the Court also misapplied the Baird test in the sense that Melinda’s
physical limitations had nothing to do with her banter-like communications with
Michael, and the case needs to be remanded so that the Court can apply the law to
the evidence correctly.
Additionally, assuming arguendo that this Court finds that Melinda failed to
marshal the evidence relating to her vulnerabilities, Michael’s argument fails for
two other reasons. First, the marshaling requirement has been greatly relaxed
recently, and failure to marshal is not a fatal flaw. See Widdison v. Kirkham, 437
P.3d 1055, ¶9 (UT App. 2018). Melinda acknowledges that she still must persuade
this Court definitively that a mistake has been committed. Id. However, the
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Court’s misapplication of law as stated supra makes the marshaling requirement
largely irrelevant as indicative of the clearly erroneous standard.
III. MELINDA’S BRIEF MET THE CRITERIA FOR BRIEFING.
As stated in her brief, the Court made no written findings of fact. Therefore,
there was no ability to provide a written copy of the findings with her brief. The
transcript for the hearing – which is part of the record – states the court’s findings
of fact. Therefore, this formalistic argument fails for this initial reason.
Then, on pages 11 and 12 of Michael’s brief, he argues that: (1) because his
lawyer told the District Court that he had presented lots of evidence to the
commissioner, that he in fact did so; and, (2) because Melinda did not mention this
fact in her brief, it was defective as a whole. However, the record belies Michael’s
position. That is, as stated, the commissioner’s minute entry only shows that
Michael presented a DCFS report at the hearing, and his objection does not cite to
the evidence he introduced during the second hearing before the judge. Given the
District Court’s requirement to make independent findings under Day, Michael’s
argument on this point seems unsupported by the record and legally flawed.
Regarding Michael’s allegation that Melinda had “blatantly” violated Utah
R. App. 24 because she had argued that Michael’s counsel had shown up late to the
first hearing before the District Court, this argument is flawed. Melinda
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acknowledges that Michael’s counsel did not show up late to the first hearing.
However, he did show up 1 hour and 37 minutes late to the second hearing. The
hearing was scheduled for 1:30 P.M. (R. 114) and the hearing began at 3:07 when
counsel arrived (R. 295). Melinda simply got the dates wrong. The fact remains
that the lateness did occur. However, to speculate that Melinda had a malicious
motive in raising this issue of fact without definitive proof violated Rule 14-301(3)
for the Rules of Professionalism and Civility.
IV. THE ATTORNEY FEE ARGUMENT FAILS.
On page 14 of his brief, Michael requests attorney fees. He alleges that his
counsel’s proffer to the District Court that he had provided exhibits used in the
objection hearing – without providing any proof that he had – mandates an attorney
fee award. However, as stated, the record indicates that Michael never proffered
exhibits 1 and 4 to the commissioner. Michael was free to provide a transcript of
the hearing before the commissioner by motion or by stipulation. Utah R. App. P.
11(h). Despite Melinda offering to stipulate that said transcript be made part of the
record, Michael elected not to do so. Therefore, there is no basis for awarding
attorney fees to Michael. Indeed, the larger question – given his misrepresentations
to the District Court and this Court is whether there is good cause to award
Melinda attorney fees.
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CONCLUSION
Justice requires this Court to reinstate a protective order against an
abusive man who has repeatedly harassed this disabled woman.
Dated this 18th day of December, 2019.

/s/ Theodore R. Weckel
Counsel for Appellant
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